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UNDERSTANDING THE STRATEGIC SALE AGREEMENTS
In the strategic sale of a company, the
transaction has two elements:
·
Transfer of a block of
shares to a Strategic Partner and
·
Transfer of management
control to the Strategic Partner
2. The transfer of shares by
Government may not necessarily be such that more than 51% of the total equity
goes to the Strategic Partner for the transfer of management to take place. In
the case of PSUs, in order that the company no longer has the character of a
Government company, the transfer of shares involves bringing down Governments
shareholding below 51%. In fact, it
must be remembered that Companies Act, 1956 only defines a ‘Government
Company’, which in common parlance, is a company in which Government holds more
that 51%. PSU is not defined in the
Act. Once the Governments shareholding goes below 51%, it ceases to be a Government
company and hence, it requires changes in the Articles of Association of the
company especially in relation to the Presidential directives etc. The Strategic Partner, after the
transaction, may hold less percentage of shares than the Government but the
control of management would be with him. For instance, if in a PSU the
shareholding of Government is 51% and the balance is dispersed in public
holdings, then Government may go in for a 25% strategic sale and pass on
management control, though the Government would post-transfer have a larger
share holding (26%) than the Strategic Partner (25%). It may be noted here that
the number 26% has a special significance in Company Law as to get a special
resolution passed, one requires at least ¾ majority in a general meeting.
Therefore, the 26% block acts as a check. Special resolutions are required
under law in case of certain critical decisions by the company such as
reduction of capital, alteration in Articles of Association and Memorandum of
Association, winding up of the company, issue of share with variation of rights
of special classes of shareholders etc. (see Annexure I). As we shall see later, in case of strategic
sale of PSUs, Government typically has affirmative rights on several issues,
which are much wider in scope than what is provided in Company Law for special
resolutions. In fact, the Agreements can be structured such that these rights
are exercisable even when Government holding goes below 26%. The other critical
number one encounters in Company Law are 10% shareholding, below which one
loses voting rights unless specially provided.
3. Since the shareholders mutually agree to certain rights and
obligations which may by dint of the Agreement between the parties assign
certain special rights and obligations on the shareholders to which they would
normally not be bound through the provisions of the Company Law, the Agreements
assume great significance in the case of strategic sale of PSUs. However, as
mentioned earlier, in case of strategic sales, the Government has to ensure
that the Agreements signed with the Strategic Partner adequately safeguard the
Governments/nation’s interests, the interests of the company and finally those
of the employees. Therefore, these documents have to be carefully structured.
This paper tries to give an insight into the issues involved, the structure of
the documents, standard clauses, and the reasons behind them and how they
safeguard stakeholders’ interests.
Environment of the
sale
4.1 Before we look at the documents itself,
it is worthwhile to understand who the stakeholders are and what is the
environment in which the transaction is taking place. The following diagram
depicts the stakeholders involved in the transaction and the interface with the
regulatory laws/organizations.
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4.2 In a strategic sale, the obvious
stakeholders are the Government and the Strategic Partner. However, there are
others also whom the transaction affects. They are the other shareholders and
the employees. Depending on the success of the transaction the value of the
shares held by the other shareholders would behave. Therefore, they are
directly affected. Transfer of shares is generally governed by the
provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 (sections 108 etc). In case of listed
companies, however, the interest of the small investors is taken care of by
SEBI through its various regulations. What we are concerned with most are the
regulations regarding takeovers, listing and de-listing. The SEBI Takeover Code
gets triggered when a person acquires more than 15% of the voting equity shares
of the company. Then, the person taking over these shares is required to make a
public offer to purchase shares not less than 20% of the equity of the company.
This provision has a great impact on the strategic sale transaction. For
instance, in the example given above, the Strategic Partner would have to buy
another 20% of the shares from the public which means he has to buy 45% of the
shares i.e. the transaction size more than doubles, which in big PSUs may mean enormous
sums of money. When the deal size goes up, it reduces the number of players and
hence competition. The other impact it can have is that it reduces the floating
stock, which can at times go even below 10%, resulting in de-listing of the
company. Reduction in floating stock affects trading and hence impacts the
value of the residual shareholding of the Government. Apart from the immediate
effect the transaction would have on the share prices, the other shareholders
also get affected depending upon whether the Strategic Partner enhances
corporate value and hence their earnings or not.
6. The PSU is clearly one important player that gets affected
by the transaction. Passed on to the hands of a serious Strategic Partner, its
worth goes up. But the reverse could also happen.
7. The Strategic Partner,
perhaps, has the highest stakes. In case the deal does not work out right he
loses money and reputation in the market. In case his assessment of the
potential of the company, its assets/liabilities position and his ability to
implement a good business plan is right, he gains money, reputation and
goodwill. The questions that confront him are: Will he get effective control of
the company? What kind of representations and warranties should he give? What
exit options should he have? What are the safeguards against breach by
Government or in case of force majuere events? What restrictions can he live
with regarding employees etc? The Government, on the other hand, is concerned
with similar questions. The Government’s chief concerns would be:
·
Protection against
asset shipping by the Strategic Partner.
·
Protection to employees
post-disinvestment.
·
Exit options for the
balance shares held by Government of India.
·
A reasonable period for
which the Strategic Partner may not exit the Company (‘Lock-in’ period). Typically, this is 3/5 years.
All these would govern the structure of the Agreements.
8. Typically, industries would have
environmental issues, especially for manufacturing units. They may not be very
relevant, however, in Consultancy Companies or Software Companies. Therefore,
the Agreements have to, at times, address the environmental issues clearly e.g.
which party takes what part of the risk in regard to responsibilities for
actions taken/not taken prior to disinvestment.
9. The concerns of the various stakeholders
are taken care of through the transaction documents. These documents are:
Strategic
sale transaction has two elements – (i) the transfer of shares and (ii) the
transfer of management. While the SPA governs the transfer of shares part of
the transaction, the SHA governs the transfer of management issues. Need for a
PGA occurs whenever the Strategic Partner or the consortium, which is bidding,
takes over the company through a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV). The SPV is
nothing but another company formed in which the Strategic Partner/consortium
members have shareholdings (see diagram below). The PGA governs the do’s and
don’ts for the Strategic Partner vis-à-vis the SPV.
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Consortium
Bidding through SPV
Single bidder through SPV
The
figures in parenthesis indicate the percentage shareholding of the Strategic
Partner/Consortium Members in the SPV and the Shareholding of the SPV in the
company. The consortium typically has a lead bidder who may be required to hold
more than 51% in the SPV. We may now look at how the various concerns are taken
care of in the transaction documents.
10. The shareholders agreement defines the
relationship between the Strategic Partner and the Government (the
shareholders) once the company is transferred to the Strategic Partner.
Broadly, it has to address issues such as:
(i)
When does the SHA come
into force?
(ii)
How does the Strategic
Partner get management control? i.e. what will be SP’s/Governments
representation on the Board, who will appoint the Chairman, the Managing
Director? What will be the quorum for the meetings? Will the Government have
any affirmative rights in some matters e.g. disposal of assets, rightsizing the
employees? What happens in case of a deadlock between the partners?
(iii)
What would be the
mechanism for raising capital?
(iv)
What are the
Representations and Warranties from the Strategic Partner, the Government and
the Company?
(v)
What are the duties and
obligations?
(vi)
What are the exit
options of the parties to the Agreement? Are there lock-in periods?
(vii)
What happens in case of
disputes? What are the arbitration provisions?
(viii)
What is the Term of the
Agreement and how does it terminate?
(ix)
What are the
breach/default clauses and the penalties for breach/default?
Recital in the Share
Holders Agreement would typically state, inter-alia, about assurance by the Strategic
Partner:
·
to continue with the
existing employees with service conditions not inferior to what they currently
enjoy and, in case of retrenchment, offer of at least VRS.
·
to make best endeavor
to protect the interest of scheduled caste/scheduled tribe/handicapped
employees.
·
against asset
stripping.
·
to continue the line of
business following best business practices.
12. In such Agreements, the Representations
and Warranties (R&W) given by the parties i.e. the Strategic Partner, the
Government and the Company become very significant. This is because it is based
on the Government’s/Company’s R&W that the Strategic Partner makes an offer
and if there is any error in the R&W by these parties, the Strategic
Partner may get a completely wrong picture of the Company/Regulatory
requirements etc. which would lead to severe disputes between the parties.
Similarly, the R&W by the Strategic Partner indicates to the Government the
competence or capability of the Strategic Partner to take over the company and
run it to the satisfaction of Government. In a sense, the R&W’s become the
foundation of the deal itself. Therefore, these have to be carefully thought
out and worded. The R&W’s typically would comprise covenants like:
·
that the parties are
competent and have the authority to enter into the Agreement.
·
that either party is
not bound or is party to any lease, agreement, decree, judgment etc. under
which default would occur in case the party executes this Agreement. In the
case of Government this clause is qualified with the expression ‘to the
knowledge of Government’.
·
the Strategic Partner
R&W will include that Strategic Partner would not retrench staff etc.
·
both sides would vote
in order to fulfill provisions of the Agreement.
13. Perhaps the biggest
concern on the part of Government in case of strategic sale of PSUs is that of
asset stripping by the Strategic Partner. Most of the PSUs have valuable assets
in the shape of plant and machinery, land, buildings etc. The Strategic Partner
may very well dispose of these assets, make money on that and quit, leaving
another sick industry behind. Though the Strategic Partner is chosen very
carefully and one to ensure that the Strategic Partner is a serious party who
is keen to run the company and help it grow, Government should always be
careful to protect against any misuse of the assets by the Strategic Partner.
Therefore, a clause on affirmative rights of Government in case of sale etc. of
assets after takeover should exist. Presence of a Government nominee for quorum
of meetings to consider asset sale etc. is a must, even for adjourned meetings.
This right would typically terminate with the termination of the Agreement. It
may not be desirable, however, to have a complete ban on asset disposal without
Government vote, as it may be necessary for the Strategic Partner to replace
some old assets with new ones or dispose of some non-core assets to generate
cash in the normal course of business. What should this threshold be? It can be
in the range of 10-26% of the net assets of the company for one or a series of
transactions.
14.1 When a company is being
taken over by a Strategic Partner, both the Strategic Partner and the
Government would like to know upfront about the exit mechanisms. Normally,
there is a lock-in period for the Strategic Partner before which he cannot sell
whole/part of purchased shares –typically 3/5 years. This is because Government
would not like to encourage a fly-by-night operator take over a crucial
Government asset. Once the bidders know that Government wants a stable and
serious minded partner in the business, only serious parties would come. Similarly,
in case of the bidder coming through an SPV, it is important to stipulate a
lock-in period (matching with the lock-in period for the company shares) for
the holding of the Strategic Partner in the SPV. Otherwise the lock in period
in case of the PSU shares becomes meaningless, as the bidder can exit out of
the SPV and the Government may be left with an undesirable partner.
14.2 Once a party has decided to
exit, the other party should have the right of first refusal. This can act
against Government at times because, in future, when Government wants to
disinvest further, no serious offers may come as those parties would be aware
of the right of first refusal provision in favour of the Strategic Partner.
Right of first refusal is normally reciprocal. Usually, the Agreement would
also provide for tag-along rights to the parties in case they do not exercise
their right of first refusal. Tag-along
right means that in case the Strategic Partner is selling its shares to a third
party, the Government can require (the tag-along right) that the government’s
shareholding be also sold along with the Strategic Partner’s share at the same
price.
14.3
For the
Government, there could also be a lock-in period after which it can exit from
the balance holding at any time. This may be desirable in some cases where the
Strategic Partner may like to have Government as a partner for some time at
least, during which period, using the Government’s presence, some issues
(licenses, land issues etc.) involving dealings with the Government can be
resolved quickly. Government would then have a ‘put’ option exercisable after a
certain period of time (say 1 year).
The Strategic Partner may also look for a ‘call’ option to buy out the
Government but this should typically get triggered after some period of time
(3-5 years depending upon the PSU). The general idea is that the Strategic
Partner is there to stay and, depending upon the situation, Government would
exit. After sometime, the Strategic Partner should have the freedom to go it
alone and buy out Government because, in any case, the policy is for Government
to ultimately quit from the commercial venture. In case of the Strategic
Partner using the ‘call’ option or the Government using the ‘put’ option, the
Takeover code should normally not get triggered, as it is a transfer between
promoters. However, the Takeover code stipulates that this exemption is
available only if the shareholder has been holding not less than 5% shares in
the Company for a period of at least three years prior to the proposed
transfer. SEBI has now exempted the Strategic Partner from the requirement.
15.1
On
takeover, the Strategic Partner would in all likelihood have to immediately
inject funds into the company for capital expenditure or to meet pending
revenue expenditure. This would be required in the case of sick PSUs and may
even be required in profit making PSUs as well. Therefore, the Government may agree to the Strategic Partner
bringing in funds at the time of takeover itself in which case provision in the
Agreement has to be made for such ‘contribution’ shares. In other cases, the
Strategic Partner may like to first take over the management and then look to
raising capital. The Agreement has to clearly provide for such situations.
Capital raised can be either as equity or as a loan. Equity capital can be
raised in the following ways:
·
Rights issue
·
IPO
·
Preferential Allotment
It may be noted that
though IPO and Preferential Allotment require Special Resolutions (which means
it requires Government’s affirmative vote in the general meeting, a Rights
issue does not).
15.2 The question to be answered is, can the
Strategic Partner raise capital – equity or loan - without any restrictions?
Since Government would not be in any position to contribute to the capital
requirements, any equity subscription would mean that the percentage holding of
the Government would be going down. If the post transfer holding of Government
were 26%, then this would imply that Government holding would go below 26% and
Government would lose control as vested in the special resolution provisions of
the Companies Act. Whether that is desirable? The one safeguard is that even if
the Government holding goes below 26%, if the affirmative rights survive,
Government’s interest vis-à-vis asset stripping, employee protection etc.
remain as the Government can always block such a proposal being passed in the
Board meeting/general meeting. But a situation may arise that within the first
few months Governments share holding can go below the stipulated 15%/10% (See
Termination section) limit beyond which the Agreement itself does not survive.
Therefore, it may be necessary that there would be a period of moratorium (say
1 year) on proposals for raising capital through equity.
Or, alternatively, the agreement may provide
that for the lock-in period (3/5 years) even if agreement terminates Government
will have affirmative vote on select items (say asset stripping, employees) as
long as government has one share. The Board shall determine the pricing of such
fresh equity. The Agreement should also state what are the restrictions for
raising equity/loans from a third party through preferential allotments etc. or
through renunciation of one’s rights issue. Normally renunciation can be to an
affiliate. An affiliate means that entity which is either the holding company
or subsidiary or owns or controls such party or is owned and controlled by such
party or is owned or controlled by the same person who either directly or
indirectly owns or controls such party. If renunciation is to other than an
affiliate then the other party should have a right of first refusal.
16.1
The
control on management by the Strategic Partner will be through the Board.
Therefore, this becomes very important. Usually, the representation on the
Board is pro-rata with share holding percentage. In some cases Government may
like to keep at least one Director with some affirmative rights though such a
situation should normally not be envisaged. The affirmative rights should go
with the termination of the Agreement except for situation explained in para
15.2. In fact, Government should not
have a Board position if Government holding goes below a certain percentage
–say, 10/15%. In some cases the Government may have the right to appoint the
Chairman but the Strategic Partner should appoint the Managing Director.
Otherwise, the Strategic Partner cannot have effective management control.
Since the minutes of Board meetings are issued by the Chairman this post
becomes crucial at times even though the Chairman is not given any casting
vote. Another issue that arises is what happens to the existing Functional
Directors who have been appointed by the Government for fixed tenures (3-5
years). The Agreement could ensure protection to them through provisions for
compensation to them for their balance tenure etc. in case the Strategic
Partner does not retain them in the company. The Agreement could also provide
that these persons be also provided VRS applicable for the below Board level
post which they had been earlier holding.
16.2
Procedure
for meetings of the Board may also be stipulated, though in the absence of it,
the normal provisions of the Company Act would, in any case, apply. But the
purpose of this clause is to specifically keep a clause that at each meeting of
the Board the Company will report on the current status of the company and
major events so that the Government nominee is informed of the goings on in the
company after takeover. The quorum clause also should state that there would be
no quorum unless at least one Government nominee Director is present in case
any matter relating to the items on which Government has affirmative rights is
being taken up. Even for adjourned meetings this should be insisted upon.
Similarly, in case of a general meeting also it should be provided that the
quorum for meetings on matters requiring Special Resolution or included in the
list of issues requiring Government’s affirmative rights would not be complete
unless at least one Government nominee Director is present. Here also, this
condition should be applicable for adjourned meetings of the general meeting.
Indemnification & Confidentiality
17.1
Through
this clause, either party indemnifies the other for any losses, liability,
claim, damages etc. which arise out of breach by that party or any of its
R&W, covenants, or agreement provided, however, that this indemnity shall
not cover any special, indirect, incidental or consequential damages.
17.2
The
Strategic Partner also agrees to keep confidential all information about the
company regarding customers, products, technology, trade secrets, systems,
operations, or other confidential information. The period could be specified
(say three years). These could be reciprocal provisions for Government.
18.1 Breach takes place when either party
breaches any of the R&Ws or other covenants in the Agreement. Force Majuere
clauses normally would be added for making exceptions to attracting the breach
clause. In case of a breach it is common practice to add a cure period (30 to
90 days). The cure period is of particular importance to Government as
procedures in Government are bound to take more time. In some formulations one
may also include as default by the Strategic Partner the event of the Strategic
Partner getting hit by any of several events like bankruptcy, convictions, etc.
18.2.
In case
of breach/default, the non-defaulting party will have a ‘call’ option for major
breaches at say 50% of Fair Market Value (FMV) or purchase price, whichever is
lower and 75% for minor breaches. Major breaches could be asset stripping,
employee related etc. In case of breach, the non-defaulting party typically
also will have a ‘put’ option apart from the ‘call’ option. For major breaches
at say 150% of FMV or purchase price, whichever is higher and 125% for minor
breaches.
Affirmative rights
19.
As
explained earlier, the Government cannot hand over the reigns of the company to
the Strategic Partner and then take no interest in the running of the company.
It has to ensure that the Strategic Partner is following the Agreement both in
letter and spirit. It has to make sure that the assets of the company are not
being misused or quietly disposed off or that the employees are not being
adversely treated or that the Strategic Partner is not taking any action
detrimental to the interest of the company. How does the Government ensure
that? One way is as suggested on the section on Board Representation i.e.
through its nominees getting the progress report from the company in each Board
meeting. However, this is not sufficient as the Strategic Partner, through the
majority in the Board, would be able to get any motion passed. The way to stop
this is for the Agreement to provide for veto rights to the Government in
certain important matters. These are called Affirmative Rights of Government.
They are included to ensure that the Strategic Partner fulfills the desired
intention of the strategic sale by the Government and utilizes the assets in
enhancing the value of the existing business and ensure growth and not
misutilise or harm the assets, including the employees. The items on which
affirmative vote of the Government nominee on the board would be required,
inter-alia, cover:
-
Asset stripping i.e. restriction on the Strategic
Partner to sell or otherwise dispose of assets of the company beyond a certain
limit - say 25% of the fixed assets etc.
-
Line of business cannot be changed
-
Guarantee exposures beyond a certain limit cannot be
taken
-
Change in service condition of employees or decision
for retrenchment
-
Opening new line of business
-
Winding up of the company
-
Reduction of share capital / share buy-back
The items included above are only illustrative and by
no means exhaustive. It would depend from case to case on what items Government
would like to reserve this right. It should not be so restrictive as to
frustrate the efforts of the Strategic Partner or be so liberal as to give an
absolute license to the Strategic Partner to do whatever he likes. It should be
noted that the list of items included for Affirmative Rights might include
items, which do not require a special resolution under Company Law. Secondly, it can be provided that
Affirmative Rights of Government survive even when Government holding goes down
below 26%. As explained earlier, there
are some issues on which a Special Resolution is required and Government
holding of 26% stake can block a proposal in the general meeting. Therefore, an
item which is not included in the list of items requiring Affirmative vote of
Government but is an item requiring a Special Resolution would be passed in the
Board if Strategic Partner has majority but then Government can block it in the
general meeting. No provision of ‘deemed consent’ by the Government should be
provided if the Government representative halts the matter from proceeding by
remaining at the meeting.
20. Dead-lock occurs when Government holds
back consent in a Board meeting on any affirmative right issue. Deadlock is
first tried to be resolved through mutual discussion of senior representatives
of parties. If discussion fails, then Government could have a ‘put’ option at
higher of FMV or unit sale price (at the time of deadlock the Strategic Partner
can hold more than the shares transferred at the time of strategic sale) plus
interest minus dividend paid. The logic
behind providing this option is that in case of minor issues, if Government
thinks fit, the Government can let the Strategic Partner run the Company by
quitting through the ‘put’ option at a premium as a dead-lock would mean that
the partners are not able to carry on together and their continuing would harm
the Company. If it is major issues say asset stripping, then Government would
not utilize this ‘put’ option and the Strategic Partner would have to live with
the situation.
21. Termination would typically take place –
-
by mutual agreement
-
company becoming bankrupt
-
either party owns less than x %(e.g. 10%/15%/25%) of
the outstanding and issued voting equity share. and/or
either party owns more than x %(75% is relevant
usually) of voting shares
In
some extremely sensitive cases Government can insist that the Agreement does
not terminate till Government holds even one share. It should be understood
that the Representations and Warranties also would automatically terminate with
termination of the SHA. But there may be some covenants that have to survive
termination e.g. covenants on confidentiality, indemnity. In case Government
wants protection to the employees not to terminate with the Agreement then this
should be taken care of also and this included amongst items that would survive
termination. Similarly, it should be noted that the affirmative rights of the Government
would also seize once the Agreement terminates. It should be noted that even if
the Agreement terminates, the parties are not released of the liabilities
accrued prior to the termination.
Arbitration
22.
Arbitration
clauses to take care of disputes concerning interpretation of the agreement or
application or rights and obligations should be provided in the Agreement.
Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, should govern arbitration.
Applicable Laws
23. Indian laws would be
applicable.
Other conditionalities
24.1
Once the
company is handed over to the Strategic Partner, Government has to take care
that the Strategic Partner would not in any way enter into any venture or
activity that creates competition for the taken over company – this could be a
‘good faith’ clause.
24.2
FMV
determination procedure should be clearly laid out in the Agreement. Either
some specific names of reputed valuation firms can be mentioned in the
Agreement or procedure for selection of the Firm/Firms should be stipulated.
The other alternative in case of listed companies is to use the term Market
Value (MV) as defined in the SEBI Takeover code of a six monthly average.
Share Purchase Agreement
25.1
As
explained earlier, the SPA covers the transaction of purchase of shares by the
Strategic Partner. After the purchase of shares by the Strategic Partner
through this Agreement the provisions of the Share Holders Agreement govern the
relationship between the Strategic Partner and the Government. The SPA
envisages the following stages:
·
The SPA is signed.
·
The SPA closes when the
Strategic Partner purchases the shares and Government receives payment.
·
Closing can take place
only when all Conditions Precedent i.e. all approvals, all R&Ws, all
obligations, covenants and agreements etc. are performed.
·
The date on which
closing takes place i.e. the Strategic Partner purchases the shares relying on
R&Ws and covenants of government and government sells the shares is called
the Closing Date.
·
The Closing Date could
be the day on which SPA is executed or any other date agreed to by the parties.
To clarify, the sequence of events is that the SPA
and SHA are signed, the SPA Conditions Precedent gets fulfilled and then
closing occurs on the Closing Date. The Closing Date is mentioned as the
effective date in the SHA when the SHA comes into effect i.e. the only
Condition Precedent for SHA to be effective is for closing to take place under
SPA. The SPA is linked to the SHA through the recital clause of the SHA which
states that the Strategic Partner and the Government are parties to the SPA and
also through the effective date clause in the SHA stating that the SHA will
come into force from the closing date (which date is defined in the SPA). The
SPA recital also states that the parties are in agreement through the SHA as to
the manner in which the affairs of the company would be carried on after the
Strategic Partner acquires the purchased shares.
25.2
The SPA
clearly states the number of shares being transferred by the Government to the
Strategic Partner, the price per share at which the transfer will take place
and the total consideration.
25.3
The
closing of the agreement could be in one of two ways. Either the full purchase price is realized at one go when
purchase price is received and SPA/SHA is signed at the same time or it could
be a two-part exercise i.e. get a certain amount (say 50% of purchase price or
just an Earnest Money Deposit) on signing of SPA and then, when all condition
precedent are fulfilled by getting all necessary approvals, SHA is signed and
balance payment made and management handed over. As explained earlier, in case of a listed Company, there exists a
further issue of Public offer. In case of a listed Company, management transfer
cannot take place until the Public offers announcement is complete, which has
to be made within 4 days of signing of SPA.
In the case of listed Companies, therefore, the SPA is first singed, the
Strategic Partner then makes the open offer announcement and anytime after 4
days the SHA is signed, with payment of transfer price and change in management
control.
Post Closing Adjustments
26.1
During the data room visits and the due
diligence exercise by the Strategic Partner, the Strategic Partner gets the
picture of the assets and liabilities of the company as on a certain date, say
31.3.2000. The deal may actually close at a much later date, say 10.10.2000. In
this intervening period, the company has been functioning and the
asset/liability position has undergone a change. There are two ways of handling
this. One is to not make any provision in the SPA for this. The Strategic
Partner makes a judgment and takes account of this when he bids for the
company. Normally, however, the Strategic Partner would insist on such a
provision especially in a company whose performance is in the decline. On the
other hand, it is in Government’s interest not to have a ‘Post-Closing’
adjustment in such cases as Government would have to pay back money and get
criticized. For example, Government may
receive Rs. 150 crores as bid price today as against a reserve price of say, Rs. 100
crores. ‘Post-Closure’ may
result in Government having to pay say; Rs. 80 crores back to the Strategic
Partner. So, effectively Government
sells at Rs. 70 crores, Rs. 30 crores below reserve price- sufficient fodder
for the Press and the opposition! These are called Post Closing Adjustments.
One way to do this is to work out the Net Working Capital (NWC) and Debt
Amounts (DA) for the last balance sheet (31.3.2000 in our example) and the
closing date accounts (10.10.2000 in our example). If the NWC increases the
Strategic Partner pays the Government and vice versa. In case the DA increases
the Government pays to the Strategic Partner and vice versa. This is the
arrangement in the Modern Food SPA. There is, however, one drawback in this
method, which is that if the company takes a loan in the adjustment period and
converts it into a fixed asset then the Government pays the difference in the
Debt Amount to the Strategic Partner and the company gets to retain the asset
so created. This is loaded against the Government. Therefore, the better
formulation is to work out the Net Asset Amount defined as the sum of the
current and fixed asset minus the sum of all outside liabilities i.e. the
networth (NW) of the company. If the NW increases, the Strategic Partner pays
to the Government and amount in proportion to the shareholding sold by the
Government and vice versa. For example,
if the Government has sold 51% to the Strategic Partner and the NW has
increased by Rs. 100 crores than the Strategic Partner would pay to Government
0.51 *100 = Rs. 51 crores. This is
because Government as 49% holder in the Company will get the benefit of 49% out
of the Rs. 100 crore increase as a shareholder. This adjustment is a one-time
adjustment. The movements in the assets /liabilities position is determined
through a post closing audit of the accounts of the company. Of course the
principles adopted for this audit has to be the same as the one adopted closing
adjustments would be closer to reality.
26.2
An
interesting issue here arises in the case of a Listed Company. This is best
illustrated through an example. Say the purchase price is Rs.500 per share at
closing. The public offers under the
Take over Code is say made at Rs.500 per share. If the post closing adjustment means Government pays to Strategic
Partner Rs.200 per share then effectively the selling price is Rs.300 per
share. In such a situation, since the public offer is Rs.500 and the takeover
price is at Rs.300, the Strategic Partner would be typically expected under the
Agreement to pay the Government the difference i.e. Rs.200 per share. This
means the Strategic Partner gains nothing through the post closing adjustment
and the Strategic Partner lands up paying a higher price to the
public/Government. On the contrary if
the post closing adjustment results in Strategic Partner having to pay Rs.200
per share to Government, then the effective transfer price becomes Rs.700 per
share and the Strategic Partner would have to compensate the public @ Rs.200
per share. To avoid such complications
‘Post-closing’ adjustment clauses are not being incorporated in the current
agreements for listed companies.
Representation and Warranties and Covenants
27.1
The
covenants of the Government could be that the Government would not encourage
any offer or proposal from another person to acquire the share; would allow a
nominee of the Strategic Partner to be stationed at the company to oversee
operation without interference in the conduct of the company affairs; without
the Strategic Partner nominee’s consent would not create a lien on the assets
of the company, issue any shares, make any change in the company’s memorandum
of association or articles of association, declare any dividend, sell any
asset, borrow any money, commit any further capital, run and preserve the
business etc. i.e. the Government would
not take any major decision till such time the company is actually not handed
over to the Strategic Partner.
27.2
The
representation and warranties of the Government could basically be that the
transaction has been duly authorized, that the execution of this agreement will
not cause any breach of other judgments or decree or any agreement etc. by
which the Government is bound and that the Government has made available all
relevant information which would be material to the purchaser.
27.3
The
company’s representation and warranties also could include that it has the
necessary authorization to carry out its obligations under the agreement, that
there are no material information on damage, destruction, loss etc. that has
not been disclosed; that there are no litigations which would materially and
adversely affect the transfer of the purchase shares or the future of this
company; that beyond what has been disclosed there are no action suits,
proceedings, investigation, etc. pending and that tax returns have been filed;
that the company is in compliance with relevant laws relating to employees,
environment, safety etc. and that the
company is not a party to the agreement which will materially and adversely
affect the operation of the company after transfer.
27.4
The
purchaser, apart from the representation that it has the necessary
authorization to enter into the agreement, also in its representation and
warranty provides that it is not a party to any agreement, obligation etc.
which would get contravened or breached or under which any default would occur
or an encumbrance would be created as a result of execution of the SPA. It also warrants that there is no suit,
action, litigation, investigation, claim, complaint or proceeding etc. in
progress or pending or threatened against the SPA so as to prevent him from
fulfilling the obligations under the SPA or his ability to pay the whole or
part of the purchase price.
27.5
The
R&Ws survive for a specified period (R&W claim period), say 3 years.
Purchaser and Government Losses
28.1
There is
another adjustment that takes place to the purchase amount, which is that
arising out of losses incurred by either party due to breach by the other party
of any of the R&Ws or the covenants, agreements or obligations in the SPA.
However, the indemnity by Government in such cases is capped. In practice this cap is a fraction (Modern
Food & Balco it was 70%) of the purchase price. The indemnity by the
Strategic Partner is unlimited.
28.2
Claims
under purchaser losses can arise through third party claims or non-third party
claims. In case of breach by any party
of representation or warranty, claim would have to be made within the R&W
claim period and in case it arises out of breach of any covenant, agreement or
obligation (in the Strategic Partner) then the notice has to come normally
within 30 days of the breach. Why this distinction? This is because the
R&Ws are more basic to the transaction unlike covenants etc. For instance,
the Company makes representations regarding litigation cases pending. If there is a breach (i.e. wrong representation
by Company) the litigation claim may take a long time to arise. Hence this R&W period is longer (around
3 years). In case of third party claim, the indemnifying party has the right at
its option and expense to participate in the defense of the third party claim
but not to control the defense, negotiation or settlement. The indemnifying party has the right to
control the defense etc. when such claim involve only money damages or the
indemnifying party has counter claims to such third party claim which the
indemnifying party is not entitled to assert. The breach usually will have a
cure period (30-90 days).
Other Adjustments to Purchase Price
29.1
There
could be other adjustments to the purchase price. For instance, in the Modern
Food (MF) document, four adjustment heads were identified:
Undisclosed assets: i.e. in case the company
recovers any amounts in excess of a stipulated amount (Rs. One lakh in MF
document) in respect of any claim or counter-claim not accounted for in the
closing date statement (A).
Tax liability: i.e. any amount of tax (income tax, sales tax, excise duty etc.),
which is disputed by the company on the closing date but had to be paid by the
company after take over by Strategic Partner under protest (B). In case the tax authorities refund any money
(C) or additional payments have to be made by the company (D).
Litigation:
The government takes over the litigation liability for cases pending on the
closing date (for a period of five years/ in case of MF) any payment under this
head (E).
Certain amounts receivable: Of some identified ‘Accounts Receivables’ those
portions which were deemed uncollectable by the post-closing audit, but later
collected (F) and those which were deemed collectable and not collected (G).
The amount B
was to be paid by the government to the Strategic Partner in a lump sum. For the rest, every six months a statement
is prepared and Z = A + C + F – D – E – G was worked out. If Z worked out to be positive, Government
gets paid. If Z is negative, then the Government pays the Strategic Partner.
29.2
The
BALCO agreement has done away with this arrangement. As indicated earlier, in
that case, all these factors get subsumed in the bid amount. The point to be
noted here is that though such adjustment clauses captures the
assets/liabilities transfer more accurately, once the company is handed over to
the Strategic Partner, such survival adjustments in perpetuity would be very
difficult to monitor and, therefore, may not be very practical and may, in
fact, result in loss to the Government.
Termination:
30.1
The
Termination of the SPA means that the deal is off because SPA’s termination
means the purchase price has not been paid. That Government may or may not
forfeit the bid amount or any other part deposits is another matter. The SPA
terminates in the following situation:
(a)
by written consent of
each of the Government and the Purchaser
(b)
by the Government in
the event that the Purchaser fails to fulfill any of its Conditions Precedent
or fails to fulfill any of its obligations at Closing;
(c)
by the Purchaser in the
event that the Government fails to fulfill any of its Conditions Precedent or
fails to fulfill any of its obligations at Closing.
30.2
Normally,
confidentiality clause will survive for a fixed term (say 3 years). However, all representations and warranties
usually have a fixed survival period, typically three years. This means that if the agreement terminates,
say after a month, the deal is off but the purchaser and government losses will
survive beyond that up to a period of three years.
Parent Guarantee
Agreement
31. Through the guarantee agreement each of the
persons who form the SPV (called ‘Principals’) basically give a guarantee that
each principal jointly and severally, irrevocably and unconditionally
guarantees to the Government that the SPV shall, at all times, fully and
faithfully perform and discharge all its obligations under the Transaction
Agreements (SPA/SHA) and that the SPV shall, at all times, duly comply with all
the terms and conditions of the Transaction Agreements; and indemnifies the
Government against losses liabilities etc. of breach by the SPV or any of the
principal of any R&W etc. in the SPA/SHA/PGA. Rest is legalese.
Miscellaneous
32.
Though we have
discussed the SHA and SPA as two separate documents it is also possible to
merge the two documents and sign one single document in case the whole
transaction is being closed in one shot i.e. all approvals are in place and the
purchase price is paid and the Agreement signed simultaneously. However, in
case there would be a time lag on getting approvals, so that the bidder may not
back out and frustrate the process, SPA could be signed and on then receiving
the approvals the SHA too is signed. In case of 100% sale of Government equity,
of course, there would only be a SPA as Government would no longer be a
shareholder. However, warranties by the Strategic Partner on protection to
employees etc can still be built into the SPA and enforced. The Agreement would
also stipulate that breach on such warranties could attract penalty such as
Government requiring the Strategic Partner to sell back the purchased shares to
Government at a discount.
[Note:
This
paper is based on the experience gained so far in the Ministry of Disinvestment.
It only attempts to
provide a flavor of the strategic sale transaction documents. In actual practice, these are documents
drafted in detail and in legal language.
Moreover, there is a constant flux of ideas requiring changes in the
structure of these Agreements from one case to the next. Therefore, there are going to be many
modifications as we proceed along the way with the various disinvestment
transactions through strategic sale.]
Annexure –I
EVENTS REQUIRING
SPECIAL RESOLUTION
1.
To alter the provisions
of the memorandum, to change the objects of the company, and to change the
place of the company registered office from one State to another.
2.
To commence any new
line of business {Section 149(2A)}
3.
To change the name of
the company (also requires approval of the Central Government) {Section 21}.
4.
To omit the word
“Limited” or “Private Limited” from the name of the company {Section 21}.
5.
Change of name of
charitable or other non-profit company by omitting the word or words “Limited”
or “Private Limited”. {Section 25(3)}.
6.
To alter or add to the
articles {Section 31}.
7.
To purchase the
Company’s own shares or specified securities {Section 77(2)}
8.
To issue sweat equity
shares {Section 79A}.
9.
To issue further shares
without pre-emptive rights {Section 81(1)} to non-members {Section 81(1-A)} or
to convert loans or debentures into shares {Section 81(3)}.
10.
To determine that any
portion of the share capital not already called up shall not be called up
except in the event of, and for the purpose of, winding up the company {Section
99}
11.
To reduce the share capital
(this requires authorization by the articles and confirmation by the Court)
{Section 100}.
12.
Approval of variation
of rights of special classes of shares {Section 106}.
13.
To remove the
registered office of the company outside the local limits of the State, Town,
or Village in which it is situated {Section 146}.
14.
To keep registers and
returns at any other place than within city, town or village in which the
registered office is situated {Section 163}.
15.
To authorize the
payment of interest on the paid-up amount of share capital raised for the
purpose of defraying the expenses of construction of any work or building or
the provisions of any plant that cannot be made profitable for a lengthy period
{Section 208(2)}.
16.
To request the
Government to investigate the affairs of the company and to appoint inspectors
for the purpose {Section 237}.
17.
To fix remuneration of
directors, where the articles requires such resolution {Section 309(1)}.
18.
To sanction
remuneration to directors other than managing or whole-time directors on
percentage of profit basis in certain instances (Section 309(4)} and renewal
under sub-section (7)}.
19.
To consent to a
director or his relative or partner or firm or private company holding an
office or place of profit, except that of managing director, manager, banker,
or trustee for debenture-holders of the company {Section 314}.
20.
To make the liability
of any director or manager unlimited where so authorized by the articles
{Section 323}.
21.
To appoint auditors in
the case of a company in which the Central and/or any State Government, and/or
public financial institution or institutions together hold twenty-five per cent
or more of its subscribed capital {Section 224A}.
22.
To appoint sole selling
or buying or purchasing agent in the case of companies having paid-up share
capital of rupees fifty lakhs or more {Section 294-AA}.
23.
To make inter-corporate
loans and investments or guarantee/security to be given, etc., if the aggregate
amount thereof, exceeds the limit of 60 percent of company’s paid up share
capital and free reserves of 100 per cent of its free reserves, whichever is
more {Section 372A).
24.
To apply to a Court to
wind-up the company {Section 433(a)}.
25.
To wind-up the company
voluntarily {Section 484(1)(b)}.
26.
To bind the company by
arrangement made under Section 517.
27.
For various other
matters pertaining to the winding up of the company. {Sections 433(a), 494(1)(b), 507, 512(1), 546(1)(b),
550(1)(b)}.
28.
To alter the
constitution of a company registered under Part IX {Section 579(1)}.